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THE LAW, ECONOMICS, AND MEDICINE OF OFF-
LABEL PRESCRIBING 
 
William S. Comanor
*
 & Jack Needleman
**
 
 
Abstract: There is a major dissonance in the current structure of regulating new drugs that 
have more than one medical indication. Physicians are authorized to prescribe these drugs for 
all indications including those beyond their approved purposes. However, product 
manufacturers are expressly prohibited from marketing or promoting their drugs for any 
purpose other than those which have been specifically indicated. While prescribing 
physicians are encouraged to gain medical information on any additional indications, they 
cannot obtain it from one of its most likely sources: the drug’s supplier. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ recent opinion in United States v. Caronia has 
challenged this regulatory structure. For the three states in the Second Circuit, although not 
the rest of the country, the FDA’s regulations prohibiting promotion of non-approved 
indications have been restricted. 
In this Article, we review the legal, economic, and medical aspects of the FDA’s current 
regulatory approach, and explore the likely consequences of a widespread adoption of the 
Caronia rule. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a major dissonance in the current structure of regulating new 
drugs that have more than a single medical indication. Physicians are 
authorized to prescribe these drugs for all indications including those 
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beyond their approved purposes. However, product manufacturers are 
expressly prohibited from marketing or promoting their drugs for any 
purpose other than those which have been specifically indicated.
1
 Thus, 
while prescribing physicians are encouraged to gain medical information 
on any additional indications, the information that physicians can obtain 
from the most likely source—the drug’s supplier—is substantially 
constrained.
2
 
Although the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) originally 
accentuated this dissonance, it has more recently retreated from that 
posture; first under pressure from the statutory admonitions of 1997,
3
 
and subsequently due to the Second Circuit’s opinion in United States v. 
Caronia.
4
 However, the issue remains in flux and is the subject of this 
Article. 
In succeeding Parts, we review the legal, economic, and medical 
aspects of this dissonance: between what physicians are authorized to 
prescribe and what information drug manufactures are permitted to 
provide about their products. A critical feature of this dissonance is its 
connection to the two separate types of information about the therapeutic 
properties of pharmaceuticals, so we start with a discussion of this 
distinction. Finally, we suggest some policy conclusions to be drawn for 
this discussion. 
I. PHARMACEUTICAL EFFICACY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
The U.S. drug approval process is a multi-stage process involving the 
identification of a potential drug and various trials that must be met to 
discern its safety and efficacy. The formal approval process requires 
manufacturers to submit a New Drug Application (NDA), which the 
FDA reviews in its decision-making process on whether to approve a 
drug for sale. Critically, drugs are approved only for the specific 
indications disclosed in the firm’s NDA. 
An essential part of the NDA is its report on the three formal stages of 
testing required by the FDA. Phase I, usually conducted on healthy 
volunteers, focuses on safety and potential side effects, and may also be 
used to understand how the drug is metabolized.
5
 Phase II examines 
                                                     
1. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 154–55 (2d Cir. 2012).  
2. See id. 
3. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).  
4. 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012). 
5. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/UCM284393.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DGM-BEB6]. 
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whether the drug appears to be effective for a specific indication, where 
the proposed drug is compared to a placebo or another drug.
6
 Safety and 
side effects continue to be assessed in these trials.
7
 Phase III is a much 
larger trial which assesses the efficacy of the drug in different 
subpopulations and at different dosages.
8
 Such trials can vary in their 
complexity, but their inferences of efficacy are fundamentally based on 
the statistical tests of the differences in outcomes in the patients treated 
with the drug and those treated with placebos or alternatives.
9
 Given the 
expense of Phase III trials and the numbers of patients required to assure 
that differences in outcomes are unlikely to be the results of sampling 
variation between the treated and control groups, the outcomes and 
indications studied in these trials are often quite limited.
10
 
At the heart of the ongoing policy debates concerning off-label 
prescribing lies the distinction between pharmaceutical “efficacy” and 
“effectiveness.” That distinction follows from the different types of 
information that can potentially be gleaned on the therapeutic benefits 
gained from taking pharmaceuticals. Consider the difference between 
the information obtained from a formal clinical trial of a prospective 
drug and the information gathered from medical practice and experience 
resulting largely from observational studies. 
The clinical trials required by the FDA to be included in a company’s 
NDA make little use of any substantive knowledge of the drugs being 
studied. The judgment that a drug is efficacious or not is based on the 
results of a randomized control trial, in which judgments on efficacy are 
made by ruling out, via statistical theory, that difference in outcomes 
between the treatment and control group are simply due to sampling 
variation.
11
 Randomization is presumed sufficient to balance the 
observable and unobservable factors that might influence outcomes.
12
 
And confidence in the results is enhanced by including only a narrow 
group of patients with limited variation in key characteristics and by 
maintaining high standards for protocol fidelity.
13
 To a great extent, the 
                                                     
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id.; see also G.R. Davies et al., Adaptive Clinical Trials in Tuberculosis: Applications, 
Challenges and Solutions, 19 INT’L J. TUBERCULOSIS & LUNG DISEASE 626 (2015). 
10. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 5; Davies et al., supra note 9. 
11. Kenneth Stanley, Design of Randomized Controlled Trials, 115 CIRCULATION 1164, 1166 
(2007). 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
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fundamental discipline underlying the trials is not pharmacology but 
statistics. 
In contrast, assessments of a drug’s effectiveness rely on experience 
and medical observation in patient populations.
14
 Understanding the 
mode of action of the underlying active ingredient can be critical in a 
clinician’s judgment about whether a particular use is appropriate, and 
these judgments are refined by extension to other settings. Note that this 
reliance typically requires a clear understanding of the drug’s 
pharmacology. 
Both methods have their strengths and their weaknesses. The clinical 
trials used to demonstrate a drug’s efficacy depend critically on the 
sample of patients being tested. Clinical trials strictly pertain only to the 
population from which the sample is drawn. If the results are 
extrapolated or generalized to apply to populations beyond those 
included in the clinical trial, the therapeutic effects found in the clinical 
trials may not apply. Furthermore, statistical tests are generally applied 
to mean values which can be misleading when the variance of individual 
outcomes is large. For drugs which are effective only for a limited 
segment of the patient population, moreover, the positive effect on that 
segment may be obscured by the drug’s unresponsiveness in the rest of 
the population. 
In addition, statistical tests require the selection of a particular level of 
statistical significance, which in effect defines the trade-off between 
Type I and Type II errors.
15
 Because of the influence of random or 
                                                     
14. To make this concrete, consider the report of the trial of sofosbuvir (sovaldi) for untreated 
chronic hepatitis C infection, as reported in the New England Journal of Medicine. Eric Lawitz et 
al., Sofosbuvir for Previously Untreated Chronic Hepatitis C Infection, 20 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1878 
(2013). The analysis section describing the methods reads in part:  
In the NEUTRINO study, we determined that the enrollment of 300 patients with HCV 
genotype 1, 4, 5, or 6 infection would provide a power of 90% to show a rate of sustained 
virologic response with the sofosbuvir regimen that was higher than 60%, a calculated control 
rate based on previous efficacy after adjustment for the presence of cirrhosis and expected 
safety benefit. 
Id. at 1880. “We used two-sided testing at the 0.05 level in both studies. Multivariable logistic-
regression analyses characterizing the relationship between a sustained virologic response and 
various prespecified demographic and baseline clinical characteristics were performed.” Id. at 
1880–81. The results section reads:  
A total of 295 of the 327 patients (90%; 95% confidence interval [CI], 87 to 93) with HCV 
genotype 1, 4, 5, or 6 had a sustained virologic response 12 weeks after treatment (Table 2). 
The two-sided one-sample exact test established the primary efficacy end point of the 
superiority of sofosbuvir plus peginterferon–ribavirin, as compared with an adjusted historical 
response rate of 60% (P<0.001). 
Id. at 1881. Some laboratory results are reported on patients who relapsed after treatment, but this is 
a limited part of the trial and not central to the decision to approve the drug. Id. at 1883. 
15. A type I error is an incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis (false positive). J.A. Freiman et 
al., The Importance of Beta, the Type II Error and Sample Size in the Design and Interpretation of 
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individual factors, minimizing the risk of approving an inefficacious 
drug means tolerating increased risks of disapproving efficacious drugs. 
The need to select among these types of error is an inevitable attribute of 
employing statistical methods for drug approval. Moreover, the level of 
statistical significance is typically fixed by standard practice without 
regard to the potential risks and benefits of a particular drug. 
In contrast, relying on observational data has its own problems. 
Outcomes invariably depend on the particular patients observed, and one 
never knows whether a specific patient is typical or not. In addition, 
patients in observational studies are not selected randomly so that 
judgments of a drug’s effectiveness may require dealing with substantial 
variation among patients along with differences in dosages as well as 
between planned and actual use of dosage regimens.
16
 As a result, the 
patient outcomes in observational studies may not represent the typical 
response to the drug. The relevant information includes both case reports 
and trials noted in the medical literature. These studies rely on an 
understanding of medical modes of action so there is more than mere 
statistics involved. In determining drug effectiveness, pharmacological 
understanding plays a major role. 
For new pharmaceuticals, the clinical trial data contained in the NDA 
is the only available basis for assessing efficacy. On the other hand, for 
drugs already on the market that may have been used extensively by 
physicians for non-indicated purposes, the medical literature is a 
prominent source of product information. Critically, judgments based on 
these different types of information can be quite different. The 
discrepancies between a drug’s performance in clinical trials—its 
efficacy—and its performance in a larger patient population—its 
effectiveness—have been regularly noted in the medical literature.17 
                                                     
the Randomized Control Trial: Survey of 71 “Negative” Trials, 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 690, 690 
(1978). A type II error is a failure to reject a false null hypothesis (false negative). Id. at 691. In the 
case of a prescription drug, a type I error would be drawing a conclusion that the drug has an effect 
different from the placebo or other treatment it is being tested against. Id. at 690. A type II error 
would be concluding the effect is absent when in the population it is present. Id. at 691. There is a 
tradeoff between these types of errors with the degree of the tradeoff and risk of each error a 
function of the magnitude of the effectiveness of the drug in the population (compared to placebo or 
comparison treatment) and the size of the samples in which the test is conducted. See Milton 
Weinstein & Richard Zeckhauser, Critical Ratios and Efficient Allocation, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 147, 154 
(1973). 
16. Anders Ahlbom, Statistical and Scientific Inference, 276 J. INTERNAL MED. 238 (2014); 
Natalie A. DiPietro, Methods in Epidemiology: Observational Study Designs, 30 
PHARMACOTHERAPY 973 (2010); Kelly M. Shields et al., Principles of Drug Literature Evaluation 
for Observational Study Designs, 31 PHARMACOTHERAPY 115 (2011).  
17. See, e.g., Hans-Georg Eichler et al., Bridging the Efficacy-Effectiveness Gap: A Regulator’s 
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Assessments of the appropriateness of using a drug based on clinical 
trials may well differ from decisions based on experience gained from 
off-label monitoring and less controlled, more observational studies. 
As off-label uses are reported, drug compendia evaluate the available 
evidence and present an assessment of appropriate uses.
18
 These 
compendia are summaries of drug information compiled by a wide range 
of non-government parties, drawing upon internal experts and external 
reviewers. They include information on drug characteristics, 
recommended uses, and dosages. Payers
19
 use compendia assessments to 
determine whether a given use will be reimbursed.
20
 Potential 
reimbursement may also affect physician prescription patterns.
21
 
In some medical specialties, it is common for the professional 
association or academy to publish accepted practice guidelines. Thus, 
before deciding whether to prescribe a drug for a specific off-label use, 
clinicians may reference their own experience, published literature, 
compendia or local or professional guidelines, and payer policies toward 
reimbursing for specific purposes.
22
 Over time this information base can 
grow, providing new assessments of both the efficacy of a drug as 
demonstrated in clinical trials in a limited population and also potentially 
the effectiveness of the drug as used in practice across broader patient 
populations.
23
 
                                                     
Perspective on Addressing Variability of Drug Response, 10 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 495 
(2011).  
18. Loreen Brown, Gain a Solid Understanding of Compendia and Its Impact on Patient Access, 
FORMULARY WATCH 252–56 (2012), http://formularyjournal.modernmedicine.com/formulary-
journal/news/clinical/clinical-pharmacology/gain-solid-understanding-compendia-and-its-imp 
[https://perma.cc/3C26-VN4K].  
19. Payers include insurance companies, large corporations, government agencies, such as the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and others who pay pharmacies the larger share of the 
pharmaceuticals used by on behalf of insured patients.  
20. ROSS MCKINNEY ET AL., DUKE CTR. FOR CLINICAL HEALTH POLICY RES., POTENTIAL 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PRODUCTION OF DRUG COMPENDIA 5 (2009), 
www.amcp.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=9442 [https://perma.cc/F2B3-QQ3V]. 
21. See generally William H. Shrank et al., A Bitter Pill: Formulary Variability and the 
Challenge to Prescribing Physicians, 17 J. AM. BOARD FAM. PRAC. 401, 401 (2004). 
22. See generally N. Ghinea et al., No Evidence or No Alternative? Taking Responsibility for Off-
Label Prescribing, 42 J. INTERNAL MED. 247 (2012); Emily A. Largent et al., Going Off-Label 
Without Venturing Off-Course: Evidence and Ethical Off-Label Prescribing, 169 ARCHIVES 
INTERNAL MED. 1745 (2009).  
23. Brian R. Flay, Efficacy and Effectiveness Trials (and Other Phases of Research) in the 
Development of Health Promotion Programs, 15 PREVENTIVE MED. 451 (1986); Russell E. 
Glasgow et al., Why Don’t We See More Translation of Health Promotion Research to Practice? 
Rethinking the Efficacy-to-Effectiveness Transition, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1261 (2003). 
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II. THE LAW AND REGULATION OF PRODUCT LABELING 
Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),
24
 the FDA is 
authorized to regulate and control pharmaceutical labeling,
25
 and it is 
this authority that serves as the basis for the agency’s post-market 
regulation. Once the FDA has approved a pharmaceutical for sale, it 
cedes substantial control over the drug to the approved manufacturer, 
who is then free to price and distribute the product largely as it wants. 
However, the FDA retains control over product labeling.
26
 
For decades, the FDA has required that the drug labels of approved 
drugs follow the format contained in its “Uniform Labeling 
Requirements.”27 Among the subjects to be included in a drug’s label are 
its “indications and usage;” information which is derived directly from 
the seller’s approved NDA.28 Furthermore, as one writer noted, “the 
emergent irony of prescription drug labeling . . . is that it increasingly 
depends upon pre-market decision-making rather than post-market 
surveillance.”29 In large measure, the decisions a pharmaceutical 
company makes in the pre-licensure period regarding which indications 
and endpoints are the focus of its clinical trials determine the approved 
labeled indications and usage. Strikingly, the drug’s history in use has 
only a minimal effect on product labeling, which instead depends largely 
on the trials reported in the drug’s NDA that were completed before the 
product was authorized for sale.
30
 
The FDA’s authority over pharmaceutical labeling could potentially 
be exercised over both physicians and manufacturers. However, the 
FDA has recognized that its authority diminishes once new drugs are 
approved.
31
 Whether for political or medical reasons, the agency has 
traditionally considered regulating the prescribing decisions of 
physicians as beyond its mandate. Its guidance to physicians on this 
issue reads: “[i]f physicians use a product for an indication not in the 
approved labeling, they have the responsibility to be well informed 
                                                     
24. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399(f) (2012). The FDCA was 
signed in 1938 by President Roosevelt. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 
75-717, 52 Stat. 1040. 
25. DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 114, 116 (2010).  
26. Wash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 30 (D.D.C. 1995).  
27. CARPENTER, supra note 25, at 614–15. 
28. Id. at 615. 
29. Id. at 615–16. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 608–09. 
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about the product, to base its use on firm scientific rationale and on 
sound medical evidence, and to maintain records of the product’s use 
and effects.”32 
This regulatory posture has accompanied widespread off-label 
prescribing and use. While there are no definitive values for the 
proportion of prescriptions written off-label, estimates range from 
twenty-one to sixty percent of all prescriptions.
33
 There are three types 
of off-label use: prescription of the drug for patients for whom it has not 
been approved, especially children; application at doses or through 
modes of administration that have not been approved; and prescription 
for conditions for which the drug has not been approved. 
Among the more common off-label uses for drugs are for the 
treatment of children, and those directed at psychiatric and neurological 
disorders, and cancer. The extent of off-label use in children has been 
widely studied in both inpatient and outpatient settings. In a 2005 review 
of thirty studies on off-label drug use in children, the authors reported 
that off-label prescribing varied from eleven to eighty percent.
34
 Rates 
were higher for inpatients than outpatients, and higher for younger 
children. In neonatal units, rates of off-label prescribing ranged from 
fifty-five to eighty percent, while in other hospital units, off-label 
prescribing ranged from sixteen to sixty-two percent.
35
 On the other 
hand, in outpatient and community hospital settings, the reported rate of 
off-label prescribing ranged from eleven to thirty-seven percent.
36
 A 
2009 study using the U.S. National Ambulatory Care Medical Survey 
found that sixty-two percent of outpatient pediatric visits included off-
label prescribing.
37
 
No comparable studies exist for psychiatric care, but there are some 
reports of the use of antipsychotic agents, which find rates of off-label 
prescribing between fifteen and sixty-six percent.
38
 In a review of off-
                                                     
32. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OFF-LABEL AND INVESTIGATIONAL USE OF MARKETED DRUGS, 
BIOLOGICS, AND MEDICAL DEVICES – INFORMATION SHEET (2014).  
33. James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use and Informed Consent: Debunking 
Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 80 (1998); David C. Radley et al., Off-Label 
Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1024 (2006).  
34. Chiara Pandolfini & Maurizio Bonati, A Literature Review on Off-Label Drug Use in 
Children, 164 EUR. J. PEDIATRICS 552, 552 (2004).  
35. Id.  
36. Id. 
37. Alicia T.F. Bazzano et al., Off-Label Prescribing to Children in the United States Outpatient 
Setting, 9 ACAD. PEDIATRICS 81, 83 (2009).  
38. Corrado Barbui et al., Off-Label and Non-Classical Prescriptions of Antipsychotic Agents in 
Ordinary In-Patient Practice, 109 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 275, 277 (2004); Stephen 
 
08 - Comanor Needleman.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/23/2016  12:14 PM 
2016] OFF-LABEL PRESCRIBING 127 
 
label drug use among cancer specialists, the General Accounting Office 
found in 1989 that one-third of the drugs prescribed were used off-
label.
39
 Furthermore, more than half of all cancer patients are prescribed 
with a drug off-label.
40
 
Overall, off-label drug use is a common component of medical care. 
As Beck and Azari conclude: 
The bare fact of off-label use of a device or drug carries with it 
no medical information, either express or implied. While 
patients might have some assurance that uses actually appearing 
on a label are safe and effective, they cannot imply from a 
label’s silence that a particular use recommended by their 
physician is unsafe, risky, novel or untried.
41
 
The extensive use of pharmaceuticals off-label could raise the legal 
issue of whether physicians need to obtain the informed consent of their 
patients when prescribing a drug for an off-label use. Currently, 
physicians are required to provide their patients with certain relevant 
information. This includes the nature of the ailment, a description of the 
proposed treatment and alternatives, the probability of success for the 
proposed therapy and alternatives, and the risks to the patient.
42
 
However, patients do not need to be informed that a prescribed drug is 
being used in an off-label manner, but only if a new use is being 
formally tested as part of a research protocol.
43
 
Overall, we observe that pharmaceuticals are frequently used for non-
approved or off-label indications, and also that such use carries no 
medical information. Off-label use is a common form of medical 
practice in many specialties
44
 and as the FDA does not assume 
supervisory control over the practice, nor does it proscribe such use.
45
 
This feature of pharmaceutical usage sets the framework for the recent 
spate of FDA regulations and legal decisions. 
                                                     
Kogut et al., Prescribing of Antipsychotic Medication in a Medicaid Population: Use of Polytherapy 
and Off-Label Dosages, 11 J. MANAGED CARE PHARMACY 17 (2005); Elisabeth Weiss et al., Off-
Label Use of Antipsychotic Drugs, 20 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 695 (2000).  
39. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: IMPLICATIONS OF DRUG LABELING 
AND OFF-LABEL USE: STATEMENT OF SARAH F. JAGGER 2–3 (1996).  
40. Id. at 3.  
41. Beck & Azari, supra note 33, at 89. 
42. Largent et al., supra note 22, at 1746.  
43. Beck & Azari, supra note 33, at 85. 
44. See supra notes 33–40 and accompanying text. 
45. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
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III. THE LAW AND REGULATION OF ADVERTISING AND 
PROMOTION 
In contrast to the FDA’s restrained approach toward physician 
prescribing of pharmaceuticals, the agency has taken a strong stand 
against off-label promotional activities. When off-label prescribing first 
became an important issue in the 1980s, then Commissioner David 
Kessler specifically decided that the FDA’s response would be directed 
at drug companies rather than prescribers and that the agency’s efforts 
would be aimed principally at discouraging unauthorized promotional 
efforts.
46
 The FDA originally took the position that any claim that a drug 
could be “safe and effective” for an off-label use was always “false or 
misleading,” although more recently it retreated from that strong 
position.
47
 Notably, it was Kessler’s decision that led to the FDA’s 
current regulatory posture to acknowledge and accept off-label sales of 
pharmaceuticals while at the same time prohibiting all efforts by 
suppliers to provide any information, whether through advertising or 
representatives, on how their products should be used. 
To be sure, the FDA has created a pathway through which additional 
indications could be approved, added to the drug’s label, and then 
promoted. Companies can file Supplemental New Drug Applications 
(sNDAs) following an earlier approval for the purpose of adding 
additional indications. Between 2000 and 2006, there were 294 sNDAs 
filed for this purpose, although that number was only about two percent 
of the nearly 14,000 sNDAs filed for all purposes during the same 
years.
48
 Whatever the advantages associated with adding additional 
indications to the drug’s label, they were apparently exceeded in most 
cases by the costs and risks involved. 
With this pathway largely blocked by economic if not regulatory 
factors, manufacturers faced the question of what practices to follow in 
marketing their drugs. A critical question was whether they could legally 
provide any information to physicians on non-indicated uses of their 
drugs. Prior to the FDA Modernization Act of 1997, the FDA answer 
was no.
49
 However, FDA restrictions came under sharp attack from the 
American Medical Association (AMA) in the 1990s, with AMA 
representatives calling for the FDA to permit physicians more access to 
                                                     
46. CARPENTER, supra note 25, at 619. 
47. Id. at 618, 620–21; see also Jerry Avorn et al., Forbidden and Permitted Statements about 
Medications — Loosening the Rules, 373 N. ENG. J. MED. 967 (2015). 
48. CARPENTER, supra note 25, at 613. 
49. Avorn et al., supra note 47, at 967–68. 
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information on off-label uses by allowing manufacturers to distribute 
scientific studies about such uses.
50
 Congress responded with the 
Modernization Act of 1997, which authorized manufacturers to 
distribute unabridged peer reviewed publications or reference materials 
to health care practitioners, pharmacy benefit managers, health insurers, 
group health plans, and federal and state governments.
51
 In its 
implementation of the new law, the FDA required these distributed 
materials to disclose the manufacturer as the source of the materials and 
to indicate specifically that the FDA had not approved the information.
52
 
The effect of these changes was to allow for the broader distribution of 
research relevant to off-label use but not for the systematic collection of 
this information. 
An early legal challenge to the FDA’s regulatory efforts came in 
Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney
53
 in 1998. The question to be 
decided was whether the FDA was regulating speech or conduct, where 
the latter was permissible but not the former.
54
 The trial judge responded 
strongly; he interpreted the prohibition as regulating speech and enjoined 
the FDA’s actions.55 However, on appeal, the injunction was vacated in 
part, although it was unclear as to what then remained of the FDA’s 
prohibitions.
56
 While direct marketing of off-label indications remained 
prohibited, the door was now open for drug companies to disseminate 
bona fide scientific information. 
This regulatory ambivalence left drug manufacturers with uncertain 
guidelines on how to promote off-label sales of their existing products. 
Some companies created separate offices from their regular marketing 
staff to provide information on off-label indications.
57
 In many cases, the 
FDA found the adopted approaches inconsistent with FDA guidelines 
and companies were subject to substantial penalties for off-label 
marketing activities
58
: 
                                                     
50. Beck & Azari, supra note 33, at 103. 
51. Id. 
52. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa, 551 (2012); 
Robert I. Field, The FDA’s New Guidance for Off-Label Promotion Is Only a Start, 33 HEALTH 
CARE & L. 220, 249 (2008).  
53. 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  
54. Id. at 331. 
55. Id. at 335. 
56. Id. at 333–37. 
57. Scott Whitcup, Chief Scientific Officer, Allergan, Inc., The Medicine, Law and Economics of 
Botox (Feb. 5, 2015). 
58. W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Regulating Ambiguous Risks: The Less than 
Rational Regulation of Pharmaceuticals 6–7 (Harv. Kennedy Sch., Faculty Research Working 
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Company Relevant Drug Year Penalty (millions) 
AstraZenica Seroquil 2010 $520 USD 
Novartis six drugs 2010 $423 USD 
Amgen Aranesp 2012 $762 USD 
J&J Ripersdal 2012 $181 USD 
 
The legal environment shifted again with the Caronia decision of 
2012,
59
 which in turn rested on Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.,
60
 a United 
States Supreme Court decision from the year before.
61
 In the earlier 
decision, the Court ruled by a six to three margin that “speech in aid of 
pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of expression protected by the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”62 In reaching this 
decision, the Court specifically rejected the dissenting position that this 
form of speech “is inextricably related to a lawful governmental effort to 
regulate commercial enterprise.”63 Critically, the Sorrell decision was 
law when the Caronia matter reached the appellate court. 
The case against Alfred Caronia was tried in 2009, years before the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Sorrell. Caronia had been convicted of the 
misdemeanor of promoting the off-label use of one of his employer’s 
pharmaceuticals and was subject to one year of probation, a fine of 
twenty-five dollars together with one hundred hours of community 
service.
64
 An interesting feature of the case is that it arose from a 
government sting operation in which Caronia had been contacted by an 
informant and asked specifically for information on the off-label uses of 
a drug he was promoting. He complied with the request, and the 
conviction followed.
65
 
Caronia appealed his conviction, and in December 2012, a three judge 
panel of the Second Circuit overturned his conviction. By a two to one 
vote, the panel found “that the government cannot prosecute 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and their representatives under the FDCA 
                                                     
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-005, 2015).  
59. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).  
60. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
61. Id.  
62. Id. at 2659. 
63. Id. at 2673.  
64. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 159, 160. 
65. Michael A. Walsh, The First Amendment and the Emerging Tort of Off-Label “Promotion” 
18–23 (Wash. Legal. Found.: Critical Legal Issues Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 183, 
2013).  
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for speech promoting the lawful, off-label use of an FDA-approved 
drug.”66 Although the majority sought to limit the decision’s reach, the 
dissenting judge warned otherwise. She observed that “the majority calls 
into question the very foundations of our century-old system of drug 
regulation.”67 
The Caronia decision emphasized that “while the FDCA makes it a 
crime to misbrand . . . a drug, the statute and its accompanying 
regulations do not expressly prohibit or criminalize off-label 
promotion.”68 Instead, this prohibition is an FDA enforcement practice 
and not the law itself. Caronia’s conviction, the court emphasized, was 
based on his “promoting and marketing the off-label use of . . . an FDA-
approved drug,”69 and not directly of “misbranding.” In so doing, the 
court sought “to avoid a serious constitutional question” of whether the 
statute’s criminalization of misbranding was itself a violation of the First 
Amendment.
70
 
What the Caronia decision left unanswered was the evident conflict 
between “prohibiting off-label promotion by a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer while simultaneously allowing off-label use” of the 
company’s products.71 It suggested, moreover, that “such barriers to 
information about off-label use could inhibit, to the public’s detriment, 
informed and intelligent treatment decisions.”72 
Finally, the court drew the following conclusion: 
If the government’s objective is to shepherd physicians to 
prescribe drugs only on-label, criminalizing manufacturer 
promotion of off-label use while permitting others to promote 
such use to physicians is an indirect and questionably effective 
means to achieve that goal. . . . Accordingly, the government’s 
prohibition of off-label promotion by pharmaceutical 
manufacturers “provides only . . . remote support for the 
government’s purpose.”73 
Not only did the court find that prohibition in question violated the First 
Amendment, but that it also served little regulatory purpose.
74
 The 
                                                     
66. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 169. 
67. Id.  
68. Id. at 160. 
69. Id. at 161.  
70. Id. at 162. 
71. Id. at 179. 
72. Id. at 166.  
73. Id. at 167.  
74. Id. at 167, 169. 
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prosecution did not seek either an en banc review of the decision or an 
appeal to a higher court.
75
 
The Caronia decision was modified slightly in an appellate decision 
in the United States v. Harkonen
76
 case filed the following year, in 
2013.
77
 In that case, the defendant had issued a press release touting a 
drug’s off-label use in language judged fraudulent even if not literally 
false.
78
 Emphasizing that the First Amendment does not protect 
fraudulent speech, the court upheld the conviction.
79
 In this case, the 
prosecution skirted the issue of off-label marketing by emphasizing the 
misleading means that were used.
80
 The decision thus avoided the 
essential question of whether manufacturers are permitted to promote 
through truthful means the off-label indications of their products. 
More recently, a successor suit was filed in the Second Circuit, where 
Caronia remains a valid precedent, seeking to enjoin the FDA from 
enforcing its prohibition of the truthful promotion of off-label 
indications.
81
 The FDA responded indignantly and argued that the suit 
was “a frontal assault . . . on the framework of new drug approval that 
                                                     
75. Thomas M. Burton, FDA Won’t Appeal Free-Speech Marketing Decision, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 
23, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324539304578260323575925896 
[https://perma.cc/9YB6-XMRZ]. 
76. 510 F. App’x 633 (9th Cir. 2013). 
77. Id. 
78. The drug involved was Actimmune, which had been approved for two rare disorders 
primarily affecting children. Harkonen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 4:12-cv-00629-CW, 2012 WL 
6019571, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012), aff’d, 800 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2015). The company began 
a Phase III trial of the drug for Idiopathic Pulmonary Fibrosis (IPF), a usually fatal lung disease 
affecting adults. Id. The overall effects of the Phase III trial failed to show that the drug was 
effective for treating IPF. Id. After the trial, the company conducted additional analyses not 
originally part of the trial and found that the drug appeared to be effective in patients with mild to 
moderate IPF—that is, the results in this group were statistically significantly different than in the 
control group. Id. FDA staff told the company that this trial data would not be sufficient to gain 
approval for Actimmune as a treatment for IPF and that further clinical testing would be required. 
Id. On the day after receiving that advice, the company issued a press release stating “preliminary 
data from its Phase III clinical trial of Actimmune® (Interferon gamma-1b) injection for the 
treatment of idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis (IPF), a debilitating and usually fatal disease for which 
there are no effective treatment options, demonstrate a significant survival benefit in patients with 
mild to moderate disease randomly assigned to Actimmune versus control treatment (p = 0.004)” 
and also claimed the trial showed “a statistically significant survival benefit in patients with mild to 
moderate IPF.” Id. at *4–5. The government complaint asserted that the press release falsely 
portrayed the clinical trial as having established that the drug reduced mortality. Id. at *5. 
79. Harkonen, 510 F. App’x at 636, 637.  
80. Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee at 52–59, Harkonen, 510 F. App’x 633 (Nos. 11–10209, 11–
10242). 
81. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No. 1:15-cv-03588-PAE, 2015 WL 
4720039, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2015).  
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Congress created in 1962.”82 In doing so, the agency maintained that the 
Caronia decision was limited to the facts of that particular case and did 
not apply more broadly.
83
 
The court disagreed and rejected the FDA’s position. It ruled that “the 
First Amendment . . . holds protected, and outside the reach of the 
FDCA’s misbranding provisions, off-label promotion . . . where it 
wholly consists of truthful and non-misleading speech.”84 However, the 
court found two limits to the Caronia ruling: “[f]irst the First 
Amendment does not protect false or misleading commercial 
speech. . . . [And] [s]econd, the First Amendment protects expression, 
not conduct.”85 
Until the Supreme Court has the opportunity to rule on these issues, 
they remain in conflict. The Caronia decision is controlling precedent in 
only the three states of the Second Circuit. In forty-seven states, the 
FDA retains its authority to prohibit the marketing and promotion of off-
label indications. However, the agency is evidently concerned by the 
prospect that the Supreme Court would limit its regulatory authority if 
the question of off-label promotion ever came before it.
86
 While the 
FDA can evade that decision for a while, it probably cannot do so 
indefinitely.
87
 Suppose that the Supreme Court rules that the First 
Amendment takes priority over the FDA’s regulatory authority, what 
might we then expect of the current structure of pharmaceutical 
regulation? We return to this question in our closing discussion of policy 
judgments.
88
 
IV. THE ECONOMICS OF OFF-LABEL PRESCRIBING 
The widespread pattern of off-label prescribing follows directly from 
the physician’s decision-making. A physician evaluating a specific 
                                                     
82. Id. at *35. 
83. Id. at *17 n.34. 
84. Id. at *52.  
85. Id. 
86. This is one interpretation of the decision not to appeal Caronia, discussed supra notes 74–75 
and accompanying text. 
87. In United States v. Vascular Solutions, Inc., the U.S. Attorney included the following 
statement in his proposed jury instructions: “[i]t is also not a crime for a device company or its 
representatives to give doctors wholly truthful and non-misleading information about the 
unapproved use of a device.” Proposed Jury Instructions at 31, United States v. Vascular Sols., Inc., 
No. 5:14-cr-00926-RCL (W.D. Tex. filed Jan. 7, 2016). He cites both the Caronia and Amarin 
Pharma decisions noted here for this statement even though they were decided in a different circuit. 
Id. at n.26. 
88. Infra notes 125–40 and accompanying text. 
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patient must assess whether the benefits from a drug outweigh both its 
direct costs and the potential complications and side effects for the 
patient. The benefits, potential complications, and side effects will be 
known only imprecisely, because even effective drugs may not work for 
a specific patient and patients differ in their risk and susceptibility to 
complications and side effects. Thus for a specific patient being treated, 
the physician must assess the likely benefit and likely risk of 
complications. For on-label use, the physician can assume that for the 
average patient for whom the drug is indicated, the clinical trial data 
indicated that the benefits would exceed their costs, or the drug would 
not have been approved for that use. But where do physicians obtain 
comparable information for off-label uses? Or, to put the question 
another way, how do physicians make the decisions about risk and 
benefit to inform their practice? 
As noted earlier, there are two alternate routes toward gaining 
information on a pharmaceutical’s attributes. What is apparent is that 
both are relevant for physician decision-making and that prescribing 
outcomes depend on more than the clinical trials required by the FDA. 
While the previous discussion explored the physician’s prescribing 
decisions, we now consider the decisions of drug manufacturers on 
whether to sponsor additional clinical trials and then seek an sNDA for 
an additional on-label indication. We consider the economic 
implications of the FDA’s regulations in a setting where off-label sales 
can be substantial. 
For a drug with only a single indication, that question does not arise. 
That indication is the subject of the firm’s NDA, which must be 
approved before the product can be sold.
89
 Where the drug has a second 
indication, however, the firm’s decision process is more nuanced. It 
recognizes that unauthorized marketing entails legal risks and the 
possibility of both large fines and legal judgments. Moreover, even if the 
firm does not engage in unauthorized marketing efforts, there can be 
strong prospects for making substantial off-label sales. 
On the other side of the ledger, the manufacturer can decide to file an 
sNDA specifically to gain approval for this second indication. Even 
though Phase I clinical trials are not indication-specific and therefore 
have already been carried out, this is not the case for Phase II and III 
trials that relate to specific indications.
90
 And these additional trials can 
be quite costly. 
                                                     
89. See supra Part I. 
90. Id. 
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A recent study surveyed out-of-pocket costs for investigational 
compounds, which are of course heavily weighted to first indications. In 
2013 dollars, these costs averaged $58.6 million for Phase II and $255.4 
million for Phase III trials.
91
 In effect, these figures indicate the 
prospective cost of securing marketing authorization for a second 
indication. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that these trials will be 
successful. Currently nearly forty-four percent of Phase II trials fail; and 
even more than ten percent fail for Phase III trials.
92
 Investing in 
additional clinical trials, as required to authorize a second indication, is 
both costly and risky. 
There is another issue as well. Even without benefit of on-label status, 
many drugs still gain considerable standing with prescribing physicians, 
which can lead to substantial sales. While those sales may be enhanced 
by a successful set of clinical trials, they can also be dampened by 
unsuccessful trials. If knowledge of unsuccessful trials becomes 
widespread, there is even the possibility that current off-label sales 
would decline substantially. Putting all these considerations together, we 
would not be surprised to find little appetite among drug manufacturers 
for securing additional approved indications. 
These considerations can be summarized through the following 
model, which describes the additional profits projected for a drug 
manufacturer from engaging in the clinical trials required to secure a 
second approved indication. Its expected profits from doing so are then: 
 
 =  𝑝 (𝑆1) + (1 − 𝑝) (𝑆2) + (𝑋 − 𝐶) 
 
In this equation, 
 represents the greater profits from doing a second trial; 
p is the probability of a successful second trial; 
S1 is the increased sales from a successful second trial; 
S2 is the reduced sales resulting from an unsuccessful second 
trial; 
X are the savings from avoiding liability for off-label marketing; 
and 
C represents the cost of the second trial. 
This model assumes a given level of profits from current on-label and 
                                                     
91. Joseph A. DiMasi, Dir., Econ. Analysis, Tufts Ctr. for the Study of Drug Dev., Innovation in 
the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs (Dec. 3, 2015) (on file with Washington 
Law Review). 
92. Id. 
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off-label prescribing and also an anticipated level of risk from the 
liability associated with off-label use. In this equation, we ignore any 
costs associated with producing the product. 
As anticipated, as the expected value of p increases, the firm finds it 
increasingly beneficial to carry out the second trial. In the limit, when p 
= 1, so that a successful test is assured, it is then profitable to undertake 
the second trial so long as: 
 
𝑆1  𝐶 − 𝑋 
 
This expression indicates the critical importance for these decisions of 
the level of C—the cost of the second trial—which can be quite high. 
In addition to the marginal calculations facing the firm under current 
FDA rules, there is a second relevant margin as well. This second 
margin refers to an alternate policy regime under which current FDA 
rules against off-label marketing are withdrawn. Consider the following 
structure where there are four possible outcomes: 
1. Under current rules, the manufacturer would have carried out a 
successful second trial but does not do so when the requirements 
are withdrawn; 
2. Under current rules, the manufacturer would have carried out an 
unsuccessful second trial but does not do so when the 
requirements are withdrawn; 
3. The manufacturer would not have carried out a second trial, but 
had it done so, the trial would have been successful; 
4. The manufacturer would not have carried out a second trial, but 
had it done so, the trial would have been unsuccessful. 
These four alternatives describe the alternate outcomes possible if the 
current FDA rules are withdrawn. We consider the welfare implications 
of each of them. 
Cases 1 and 3 have similar implications for welfare calculations in 
that only positive outcomes follow from the revised policy posture. In 
Case 1, the market outcomes are the same as under the original FDA 
rules, although without the costly trials, so their costs are saved. In Case 
3, the trials are not carried out in any case, but now marketing the second 
indication is permitted. Presumably, sales are increased and greater 
health benefits achieved from the increased use of effective drugs. 
Although the sources of the gains are different in the two cases, they are 
both fully positive. 
Case 2 offers a more uncertain outcome. Clinical trials, which would 
08 - Comanor Needleman.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/23/2016  12:14 PM 
2016] OFF-LABEL PRESCRIBING 137 
 
have been undertaken under current FDA rules but which would not 
have been successful, are now foregone and their cost saved. However, 
an inefficacious drug can now be promoted and its sales are increased as 
a result. That case may represent the most idealized circumstances 
supporting the existing rules. However, the net effect is uncertain 
because the cost of the trials must be balanced against the health benefits 
derived from limiting sales of an inefficacious product. The issue turns 
on the relative size of the resulting health benefits as compared with the 
costs of the trials. 
In Case 4, the trials are not undertaken in any event so there are no 
cost savings from dropping the current FDA rules. However, companies 
are now permitted to promote inefficacious drugs leading presumably to 
increased sales without commensurate health effects. Preventing the 
marketing and promotion of such drugs is the ostensible purpose behind 
the current FDA rules, and these are no longer operative. There are only 
negative effects from eliminating the current FDA rules in this case. 
Although the health outcomes of the four cases are reasonably 
apparent, at least in general terms, what is unclear are the probabilities 
associated with each alternative. Appraising the policy gains or losses 
resulting from eliminating the current FDA rules requires a judgment of 
the relative frequency of the four alternatives; but unfortunately there is 
not sufficient information available to make that judgment. 
V. THE MEDICINE OF OFF-LABEL PRESCRIBING 
The medical rationale for off-label use seems clear. While clinical 
trials estimate average effects, one of the hallmarks of drug therapies is 
the heterogeneity of patient outcomes,
93
 which has been especially noted 
in regard to psychotropics.
94
 Physicians need to tailor their choices of 
therapy to the responsiveness of their patients. This factor is particularly 
relevant where evidence from clinical trials is limited. For example, 
children are often excluded from trials because the number of cases is 
small and the gains to the drug company of having the drug licensed for 
children are more limited. But observation and understanding of a drug’s 
underlying mechanism of action can strongly suggest its extension to 
treatment of children. Furthermore, there can be similar reasons to 
                                                     
93. See generally David J. Stewart & Razelle Kurzrock, Fool’s Gold, Lost Treasures, and the 
Randomized Clinical Trial, 13 BMC CANCER 193 (2013). 
94. See generally Stephen Z. Levine & Stefan Leucht, Treatment Response Heterogeneity in the 
Predominant Negative Symptoms of Schizophrenia: Analysis of Amisulpride vs Placebo in Three 
Clinical Trials, 156 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 107 (2014). 
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extend a drug’s application beyond the conditions for which it is 
indicated on the drug’s label.95 
In prescribing drugs for off-label indications, physicians employ both 
their own direct experience and that of other physicians as reported on a 
case by case basis. Case reports are common in clinical journals, and 
often serve to indicate what care is appropriate. The exploration of 
clinical effectiveness for individual patients has received increased 
attention as representing “N-of-1” trials, and there are available 
guidelines for conducting and reporting these trials.
96
 If there is 
sufficient interest in a potential use, a post-licensing clinical trial may 
also be pursued, but this is not often necessary to establish an off-label 
use as standard practice. 
Moving beyond the experience of an individual physician’s practice 
requires physicians to rely on case reports and trials of varying 
sophistication and rigor as reported in the medical literature. Acceptable 
off-label prescribing is often reflected in published drug compendia 
offering recommendations on appropriate use,
97
 local or professional 
society practice guidelines, and payer reimbursement policies which are 
based on compendia, professional society recommendations, and 
physicians’ own assessment of appropriateness. 
There are many examples of how drugs have become widely used for 
off-label indications through such means, and we discuss here two as 
illustrative of the process. 
Persistent pulmonary hypertension (PPHN) in the newborn is a 
serious condition related to a failure in the normal transition in 
circulation from low fetal pulmonary blood flow to a high pulmonary 
flow as the lungs assume the function of exchanging oxygen and carbon 
dioxide.
98
 The causes are diverse and untreated mortality is high.
99
 
Inhaled nitrous oxide, which acts as a pulmonary vasodilating agent, 
has emerged as the preferred standard treatment, although up to thirty 
percent of patients do not respond to it.
100
 Viagra (sildenafil) is also a 
                                                     
95. Jeffrey L. Blumer, Off-Label Uses of Drugs in Children, 104 PEDIATRICS 598, 599 (1999). 
96. See generally Larissa Shamseer et al., CONSORT Extension for Reporting N-of-1 Trials 
(CENT) 2015: Explanation and Elaboration, 350 BMJ 1793 (2015); Sunita Vohra et al., CONSORT 
Extension for Reporting N-of-1 Trials (CENT) 2015 Statement, 350 BMJ 1738 (2015). 
97. See generally Brown, supra note 18. 
98. Steven H. Abman et al., Pediatric Pulmonary Hypertension: Guidelines from the American 
Heart Association and American Thoracic Society, 132 CIRCULATION 2037, 2038 (2015). 
99. Id. at 2038–39.  
100. J.N. Travadi & S.K. Patole, Phosphodiesterase Inhibitors for Persistent Pulmonary 
Hypertension of the Newborn: A Review, 36 PEDIATRIC PULMONOLOGY 529, 529–35 (2003). 
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vasodilating agent. In 1999, a case was reported in U.S. medical 
literature of Viagra use to assist in the withdrawal of an infant from 
inhaled nitrous oxide therapy.
101
 Following this report, several cases 
described the successful use of Viagra in babies in Bangladesh and India 
to treat pulmonary hypertension in children when standard therapy had 
failed.
102
 
There was considerable controversy regarding this therapy, including 
charges that it might encourage unethical experimentation. A 2003 
review article concluded that “recent studies have suggested a role for 
specific phosphodiesterase (PDE) inhibitors in the management of 
PPHN [and] Sildenafil [Viagra] appears the most promising of such 
agents.”103 The review emphasized, however, the “need for randomized-
controlled trials to determine the safety, efficacy, and long-term outcome 
following treatment with sildenafil in PPHN.”104 Over the next four 
years, additional case reports on the use of Viagra in the treatment of 
neonatal pulmonary hypertension were published
105
 as well as reports of 
animal models
106
 and a small-scale randomized trial
107
 with mixed 
                                                     
101. Andrew M. Atz & David L. Wessel, Sildenafil Ameliorates Effects of Inhaled Nitric Oxide 
Withdrawal, 91 ANESTHESIOLOGY 307, 307–09 (1999).  
102. See generally D. Abrams et al., Sildenafil as a Selective Pulmonary Vasodilator in 
Childhood Primary Pulmonary Hypertension, 84 HEART E4 (2000); Sanjay Kumar, Indian Doctor 
in Protest After Using Viagra to Save “Blue Babies,” 325 BMJ 181 (2002); James Oliver & David 
J. Webb, Sildenafil for “Blue Babies”: Such Unlicensed Drug Use Might Be Justified as Last 
Resort, 325 BMJ 1174 (2002). 
103. Travadi & Patole, supra note 100, at 529. 
104. Id. 
105. See generally M. Chaudhari et al., Sildenafil in Neonatal Pulmonary Hypertension Due to 
Impaired Alveolarisation and Plexiform Pulmonary Arteriopathy, 90 ARCHIVES DISEASE 
CHILDHOOD: FETAL & NEONATAL ED. F527 (2005); Kam-lun Ellis Hon et al., Oral Sildenafil for 
Treatment of Severe Pulmonary Hypertension in an Infant, 88 BIOLOGY NEONATE 109 (2005); 
Robert L. Keller et al., Treatment of Rebound and Chronic Pulmonary Hypertension with Oral 
Sildenafil in an Infant with Congenital Diaphragmatic Hernia, 5 PEDIATRIC CRITICAL CARE MED. 
184 (2004); Astrid E. Lammers et al., Intravenous Sildenafil as an Effective Treatment of 
Pulmonary Hypertensive Crises During Acute Intestinal Malabsorption, 16 CARDIOLOGY YOUNG 
84 (2006); E. Garcia Martinez et al., Sildenafilo en el Tratamiento de la Hipertensión Pulmonar 
[Sildenafil in the Treatment of Pulmonary Hypertension], 59 ANALES DE PEDIATRÍA 110, 110 
(2003) (see abstract); J.A. McEniery et al., Infant Pertussis Deaths and the Management of 
Cardiovascular Compromise, 40 J. PEDIATRIC CHILD HEALTH 230 (2004). 
106. See generally Karen E. Binns-Loveman et al., Sildenafil and an Early Stage of Chronic 
Hypoxia-Induced Pulmonary Hypertension in Newborn Piglets, 40 PEDIATRIC PULMONOLOGY 72 
(2005); Yvonne A. Bremer et al., Sildenafil Citrate (Viagra) Induces Cardioprotective Effects After 
Ischemia/Reperfusion Injury in Infant Rabbits, 57 PEDIATRIC RES. 22 (2005); Philippe Deruelle et 
al., Pulmonary Vascular Effects of Nitric Oxide-cGMP Augmentation in a Model of Chronic 
Pulmonary Hypertension in Fetal and Neonatal Sheep, 289 AM. J. PHYSIOLOGY: LUNG CELLULAR 
& MOLECULAR PHYSIOLOGY, at L798 (2005); Philippe Deruelle et al., Effects of BAY 41–2272, a 
Soluble Guanylate Cyclase Activator, on Pulmonary Vascular Reactivity in the Ovine Fetus, 289 
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results. The use of Viagra to treat neonatal pulmonary hypertension is 
increasing and becoming more established in clinical practice despite 
calls for both clinical trials and the characterization of this treatment 
modality as experimental. 
The need for follow-up clinical trials for off-label practices, which 
had been established originally through case reports and a growing 
consensus among practitioners, is also illustrated by the case of 
Aprotinin. That drug is approved “for prophylactic use to reduce 
perioperative blood loss and the need for blood transfusion in patients 
undergoing cardiopulmonary bypass in the course of coronary artery 
bypass graft surgery who are at an increased risk for blood loss and 
blood transfusion.”108 This drug became a standard treatment to reduce 
the risk of bleeding for patients undergoing invasive cardiovascular 
procedures even though it had not been subject to widespread testing. An 
observational study, however, reported that use of Aprotinin was 
associated with twice the risk of renal failure requiring dialysis.
109
 The 
drug’s sales were suspended in May 2008, but sales resumed in Europe 
in 2012 after the European Medicine Agency recommended the 
suspension be lifted.
110
 
These two cases illustrate several important themes in evaluating the 
medical implications of the off-label drug use. First, as noted earlier, the 
methods and assumptions of the clinical trials used initially to justify the 
licensure of drugs, and those used to extend their uses to other 
indications, are substantially different and have never been reconciled. 
Moreover, we do not offer here a means to integrate these two kinds of 
knowledge or understanding. This is the case despite the considerable 
interest in developing methods for individualizing therapy based on 
genetic, metabolic, or physiological markers. 
Second, the case of Aprotinin illustrates that even where there is close 
observation of individual cases, there remains a need for larger-scale 
pooling and systematic review of the reported body of cases to fully 
understand the off-label use of particular drugs. A commentary in the 
                                                     
AM. J. PHYSIOLOGY: LUNG CELLULAR & MOLECULAR PHYSIOLOGY, at L727 (2005). 
107. See generally Christian Stocker et al., Intravenous Sildenafil and Inhaled Nitric Oxide: A 
Randomised Trial in Infants After Cardiac Surgery, 29 INTENSIVE CARE MED. 1996 (2003). 
108. TRASYFOL® (APROTININ INJECTION), FDA.GOV (2006), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/ 
drugsatfda_docs/label/2006/020304s022lbl.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZT7-W8J3].  
109. Dennis T. Mangano et al., The Risk Associated with Aprotinin in Cardiac Surgery, 354 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 353, 353 (2006). 
110. Aprotinin Injection (marketed as Trasylol) Information, FDA.GOV (last updated May 14, 
2008), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsand 
Providers/ucm142720.htm [https://perma.cc/W7K5-4569].  
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same issue in which the Aprotinin result was reported argued for the 
development of improved statistical and epidemiological methods to 
minimize the confounding of observational studies.
111
 Among the 
approaches recommended was the use of propensity scoring and 
collection of substantial number of covariates.
112
 The author noted the 
need for obtaining results that can be treated with confidence and 
distinguished them from methods that require a substantial number of 
cases and substantial data on each case.
113
 A further statement in the 
same issue called for more extensive Phase IV clinical trials—that is, 
post-approval trials—to “be required before the indications for 
pharmaceutical agents are expanded, particularly when increased doses 
are required or administration in high-risk patients is proposed” and that 
the FDA should encourage and support such trials.
114
 
A commentary on published studies reported that the off-label use of 
Misoprostol to induce labor had contributed to uterine rupture. It 
concluded that “[t]he off-label use of drugs should be limited to 
officially sanctioned, carefully controlled trials. Opportunistic off-label 
drug use, with no mechanism to guarantee adequate evidence, again and 
again has had tragic consequences for women and children.”115 
Physicians and insurers seeking guidance on appropriate off-label use 
have various sources of information beyond the pharmaceutical 
companies, of which drug compendia are a major one. The Medicare 
program, for example, restricts reimbursement for prescription drugs to 
“medically accepted indications.”116 This is defined as on-label FDA-
                                                     
111. See generally David Hunter, First, Gather the Data, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 329 (2006). 
112. Hunter describes the propensity scoring in the following language:  
For instance, the propensity-score approach estimates the probability that a person will be 
given a prescription for a particular drug on the basis of his or her demographic, lifestyle, and 
clinical characteristics; this score can then be used to control for potential confounding from 
these characteristics. Another potential application of the score is to match patients who 
received the study drug with control patients who did not but who have the same propensity 
score; in essence, this is an attempt to replicate the process of randomization, in which other 
unmeasured and potentially confounding characteristics are randomly distributed among those 
who receive a drug and those who do not. 
Id. at 330. 
113. Id. 
114. Gus J. Vlahakes, The Value of Phase 4 Clinical Testing, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 413, 414 
(2006).  
115. Marsden Wagner, Off-Label Use of Misoprostol in Obstetrics: A Cautionary Tale, 112 
BJOG 266, 267 (2005). 
116. See U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG 
BENEFIT MANUAL: CHAPTER 6 – PART D DRUGS AND FORMULARY REQUIREMENTS § 10.6 (2010) 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescription-Drug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/ 
downloads/chapter6.pdf [https://perma.cc/37W9-V6CV].  
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approved use or use supported by one or more compendia identified by 
statute.
117
 These compendia are the American Hospital Formulary 
Service Drug Information (AHFS-DI), the United States Pharmacopeia-
Drug Information publication, and the DrugDEX Information System. 
Other compendia also exist. Because the compendia are an authoritative 
source of information on acceptable off-label uses, drug companies have 
substantial interest in seeing their products included in them. 
Compendia use similar methods for reviewing drugs and uses for 
inclusion: 
A team of researchers (who may be compendia employees) 
reviews the literature for new clinical trials presented in papers, 
meeting abstracts, guidelines, or review articles. The editorial 
team evaluates sources of new data, ideally using an explicit and 
uniform set of standards. A decision is made about whether to 
include the new results in the updated chapter. Depending on the 
particular compendium publisher, this decision may involve the 
use of external consultants. 
Once a draft is prepared, most compendium publishers ask 
external reviewers (often consultants) to review the draft. The 
editors subsequently decide how, and whether, to incorporate the 
reviewers’ comments. A final draft is then prepared, approved, 
and published.
118
 
Despite their similar processes, compendia do not always reach 
similar conclusions. There is extensive literature reporting conflicts in 
the compendia across appropriate uses and flagging of issues such as 
drug-drug interactions.
119
 
The authors of a Duke white paper on this subject conclude that the 
sources of information for assessing off-label use can be weak and the 
potential for conflict of interest in the review of indications can be high, 
with different compendia approaching the conflict of interest issue in a 
                                                     
117. Id.  
118. MCKINNEY ET AL., supra note 20, at 27–28. 
119. See generally Amy P. Abernethy et al., Systematic Review: Reliability of Compendia 
Methods for Off-Label Oncology Indications, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 336 (2009); D. Conde-
Estevez et al., Potential Clinical Relevant Drug-Drug Interactions: Comparison Between Different 
Compendia, Do We Have a Validated Method?, 26 ANNALS ONCOLOGY 1272 (2015); Božana S. 
Nikolić & Maja S. Ilić, Assessment of the Consistency Among Three Drug Compendia in Listing 
and Ranking of Drug-Drug Interactions, 13 BOSNIAN J. BASIC MED. SCI. 253 (2013); Richard P. 
Paczynski et al., Quality of Evidence in Drug Compendia Supporting Off-Label Use of Typical and 
Atypical Antipsychotic Medications, 24 INT’L J. RISK & SAFETY MED. 137 (2012); Renee Twombly, 
Drug Compendia in Oncology: Are They Flawed?, 101 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1604 (2009). 
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variety of ways.
120
 A 2014 assessment of compendia processes 
concluded, “[a]lthough the compendia publishers and CMS are aware of 
many of the current problems with the compendia and have attempted to 
improve the system, much more can and should be done.”121 
It is not clear how much guidance physicians seek on off-label use or 
how rigorous their standards are for demonstrated effectiveness. A 2006 
study by Radley found that among the twenty-one percent of drug 
prescriptions for off-label use “most (73%) lacked evidence of clinical 
efficacy, and less than one third (27%) were supported by strong 
scientific evidence.”122 
While the medical literature calls for expanded Phase IV trials, the 
sources of funding for such trials are not clear. One of the important 
lessons of current off-label use of drugs is that it limits the incentive for 
drug manufacturers to sponsor extended clinical trials of their drugs. 
Once a drug has been approved by the FDA, regardless of how narrow 
the basis for its approval, physicians can extend its use.
123
 Prior to the 
FDA Modernization Act of 1997, drug companies faced substantial 
restrictions on distributing information on off-label use.
124
 This may 
have created some incentive to formally sponsor trials. However, that 
changed with the relaxation of restrictions contained in the 1997 law. 
Finally, we observe that the companies who develop the 
pharmaceuticals generally have considerable understanding of their 
attributes. As a result, seeking to exclude them from the information-
gathering process can be an important factor which limits the drugs’ 
effective use. 
CONCLUSION 
The FDA offers conflicting judgments on the off-label use of 
approved pharmaceuticals. On the one hand, it is not dissuaded by the 
Caronia decision, and considers it largely a hurdle to be overcome. 
Since that decision is not binding in forty-seven states, the FDA still has 
room to make its rulings operative, although its reliance on U.S. 
attorneys and state attorneys general for its enforcement efforts may 
have some restraining influence. 
                                                     
120. See generally MCKINNEY ET AL., supra note 20.  
121. Lindsey Gabrielsen, Bias at the Gate?: The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Influence on the 
Federally Approved Drug Compendia, 40 AM. J.L. & MED. 141, 163 (2014). 
122. Radley et al., supra note 33, at 1023. 
123. See supra Part II.  
124. See supra Part II.  
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On the other hand, the FDA’s own guidance advisories recognize the 
medical importance of much off-label pharmaceutical use. The agency 
states that “good medical practice . . . . [may] require that physicians use 
legally available drugs, biologics and devices . . . for an indication not in 
the approved labeling.”125 While the agency cautions the prescribing 
physicians to base their use on “firm scientific rationale and on sound 
medical evidence,” it further states that FDA permission for this use is 
not required.
126
 
In this pronouncement, the FDA’s inconsistency is apparent. 
Although it suggests that off-label use should rest on strong medical 
evidence, it then restricts an important source from which that 
information can be gained. One reason for this contradiction could be 
that the agency believes any information received from a product’s 
manufacturer, unlike that offered by other parties, can be biased and 
should not be trusted. 
The agency’s skepticism that manufacturers provide balanced and full 
information of the relevant evidence has some support. A 2011 review of 
forty-one unsealed whistleblower complaints found a wide range of 
unauthorized marketing mechanisms, including self-serving 
presentations of the medical literature in three-quarters of the cases and 
direct financial incentives for physicians in eighty-five percent of the 
cases.
127
 While these observations are drawn from a limited sample of 
cases in which the FDA pursued fraud complaints, they offer a context 
for FDA concerns. 
To an increasing extent, however, the FDA has lost its gate-keeping 
function. As pharmaceuticals are increasingly paid for by third-party 
payers, both private and public, the decisions of these parties on which 
drugs to support increasingly determines prescribing outcomes.
128
 
Unless payers are willing to authorize payment for particular drugs, 
physicians are wary of prescribing them—regardless of being legally 
permitted to do so. This leads to the question of whether payers will 
regularly authorize payment for off-label indications. 
This question was the subject of a recent court challenge in Layzer v. 
                                                     
125. “Off-Label” and Investigational Use of Marketed Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices - 
Information Sheet: Guidance for Institutional Review Boards and Clinical Investigators, FDA.GOV 
(June 25, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126486.htm 
[https://perma.cc/K3QZ-QZLZ]. 
126. Id. 
127. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Strategies and Practices in Off-Label Marketing of 
Pharmaceuticals: A Retrospective Analysis of Whistleblower Complaints, 8 PLOS MED., Apr. 2011, 
at 1, 1. 
128. Shrank et al., supra note 21. 
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Leavitt,
129
 which analyzed whether Medicare was obligated to pay for 
medications used for off-label indications.
130
 By statute, Medicare is 
obligated to cover drugs used for a “medically accepted indication” as 
defined in certain compendia.
131
 In this case, the patient’s physician had 
ordered a drug with recognized support in the medical literature, 
although it was not for an approved indication included in the relevant 
compendia.
132
 Observing that “FDA-approved uses often lag behind 
knowledge of actual effective treatment,” the court dispensed with the 
compendia requirement and effectively authorized coverage.
133
 The 
court ruled that, consistent with FDA’s published advisories, “medically 
accepted indications” can include off-label use.134 
In a related case, the district court was again asked to decide on 
Medicare’s coverage of non-label indications.135 It ruled the program 
“does not cover ‘off-label’ . . . use that is not a ‘medically accepted 
indication.’”136 However, it had previously limited the latter category to 
drugs either approved under the FDCA or authorized for inclusion in 
certain medical compendia.
137
 There remains ambiguity as to what 
medical data is required for Medicare reimbursement. 
Although the principal public payer’s reimbursement policies are 
embodied in statute, this is not so for private payers.
138
 While guided by 
the terms of their contractual obligations, they have greater room to 
exercise judgment. They are also impacted by issues of cost and their 
judgment as to whether the drug’s therapeutic value is worth its cost. 
That judgment applies whether the relevant indication is on or off-label. 
The critical missing feature in the FDA’s authority is cost. That factor 
is not part of its authorizing mandate. As costs increase and as payers 
rather than patients increasingly bear the costs of pharmaceutical 
interventions, the distinction between on- and off-label use could lose 
much of its significance. When payers rather than physicians or patients 
determine which drugs are paid for and for which purposes, and where 
                                                     
129. 770 F. Supp. 2d 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
130. Id. at 581.  
131. Wagner, supra note 115. 
132. Layzer, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 582.  
133. Id. at 586.  
134. Id.  
135. United States ex rel. Fox RX, Inc. v. Omnicare, Inc., No. 1:11–cv–00962–WSD, 2012 WL 
8020674 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2012). 
136. Id. at *8.  
137. Id. at *18–19.  
138. Joshua Cohen et al., Off-Label Use Reimbursement, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 391, 391 (2009). 
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these decisions depend strongly on the payers’ reading of the available 
medical literature, then there is little reason for keeping drug 
manufacturers from contributing to the ongoing debates. But this will 
happen only when and if the Supreme Court applies the Caronia rule 
generally throughout the country. 
When patients paid for prescribed drugs out-of-pocket, as they did for 
nearly ninety-six percent of pharmaceuticals purchased in 1960,
139
 then 
the prescribing decisions of physicians were critical, and the FDA’s 
control over the relevant information available to physicians was 
controlling. However, as third-party payers have paid increasing 
proportions of the drug bill, they have asserted greater control over 
which drugs they will reimburse.
140
 How payers make their decisions is 
still unclear, although it is reasonable to assume that insurers seek to 
maximize the therapeutic gain from the pharmaceuticals prescribed their 
subscribers for given levels of expenditures. 
For payers, the distinction between on and off-label uses may become 
increasingly unimportant as compared with their own evaluation of the 
therapeutic gains resulting from the use of a pharmaceutical. In effect, 
payers can apply their own evaluations as contrasted with those 
embodied in the FDA’s NDA. While this shift has been ongoing, it 
would likely be accelerated by a widespread acceptance of the Caronia 
rule. In effect, that regulatory change may be occurring just as its 
importance in the marketplace is declining. To the extent that payers 
become the gatekeepers for appropriate off-label use, how they make 
these decisions will be critical for patients and physicians. Specifically 
of concern will be how they assess evidence on appropriate use, the 
extent to which they rely upon the authoritative albeit flawed 
compendia, and the extent to which they ask pharmaceutical companies 
to provide additional information. The engagement of payers will 
introduce another set of external actors to which pharmaceutical 
companies will need to be responsive. That would be an ironic result of 
the widespread adoption of the Caronia rule. 
                                                     
139. Patricia M. Danzon & Mark V. Pauly, Health Insurance and the Growth of Pharmaceutical 
Expenditures, 45 J.L. & ECON. 587, 591 (2002). 
140. Shrank et al., supra note 21. 
